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ABSTRACT
An experiment was performed to assess the efficacy of Post-experimental Inquiry
(PEI) questions. Experiments involving deception assume participant naiveté to the study
protocol. The present study implemented a PEI to assess the influence of an ethnic prime
on stereotyped attitudes in order to assess PEI accuracy. A confederate (posting as
another participant) additionally informed some participants as to the true purpose of the
study, a violation of study integrity. The PEI was used to assess accuracy in two ways:
awareness of the study hypotheses and admission to receiving information. The PEI was
itself manipulated in one of two ways; the introduction of a descriptive norm paragraph
(vs. control) and default option swapped (vs. control). Participants informed of the study
hypothesis reported higher awareness and admitted more information. The norm prime
and default option swapped conditions did not increase PEI accuracy. The implications
for PEI accuracy are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The use of deception in psychology has a long history, perhaps as old as the
discipline itself (Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997). Deception, which is providing any
information to intentionally mislead participants, is used if there are no alternative nondeceptive procedures to collect the same information (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008). When
deception is used in psychological research, it is used because the researcher assumes that
full awareness of the study protocol would change the results of the experiment; for some
classic and contemporary procedures, this is obviously so. For example, Milgram’s
classic study on obedience (1963) could not have been performed without some level of
deception. For more subtle procedures (such as Lepore & Brown, 2002), researchers
assume that naïve participants provide more honest feedback in certain tasks. In these
procedures, quality of data hinges on participants’ naiveté to study details, so the majority
of researchers use some form of post-experimental inquiries to assess participant level of
information (Blackhart, Brown, Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 2012). The present experimental
study assessed this assumption—that post-experimental inquiries accurately delineate
naïve participants from non-naïve participants.
Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) formulated four factors necessary for deception:
(1) suspiciousness of the protocol will not affect its response outcomes; (2) participants
arrive with no knowledge of the experiment; (3) the experiment does not indicate to
participants they are being deceived; and (4) knowledge of the experiment gained before
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or during the protocol can be assessed by the experimenter. Violations of these
assumptions, if undetected, seriously compromise the integrity of experimental results.
There are empirical reasons to be cautious about all four factors.
Does deception or suspiciousness influence experimental results?
Suspiciousness of the experimental protocol or having any information about the
protocol at all can change behavioral outcomes. Gardner (1978) conducted a series of
studies on the negative aftereffects of a noise blast during the period in which ethics
guidelines began to mandate providing subjects with informed consent forms. The
researcher discovered that the negative aftereffects of a noise blast vanished in
participants for whom informed consent was required; he initially discovered this effect
in different groups of participants before and after the guidelines, then replicated this
effect by experimentally manipulating the level of informed consent. Other phenomena
similarly change or disappear depending on the level of information participants have
(Adair, Dushenko, & Lindsay, 1985).
Changes in the information participants have changes the behaviors they exhibit
in a study. Suspicious participants in a rigged impression formation experiment, for
example, display less conformity than non-suspicious participants (Stang, 1976). Other
researchers, directly manipulating the level of suspicion among participants by providing
different degrees of information to them, have found that suspicion does not impact
conformity studies (Gallo, Smith, & Mumford, 1973). Gallo and colleagues propose two
interpretations for their lack of observed changes. Demand characteristics may lead
participants to give information that lends itself to prove the experimenter correct. The
second cause may be inattention; participants did not attend to or process the information
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about the study hypotheses provided to them. Either situation creates a problem. By
definition, participants that exhibit socially desirable answers are not giving unbiased
data; participants that know details of the study but do not attend to these details may
change their behavior in an experiment due to implicit influences without realizing and
reporting that they have been influenced in some way.
In some experimental protocols, awareness of the true nature of the study would
obviously compromise the results. In a classic psychology experiment, Milgram (1963)
assigned participants to be a “teacher,” asking them to willingly administer progressively
stronger electrical shocks to a “learner.” Students in introductory psychology courses will
recognize this study and its false “learners,” who were experimental confederates. If the
“teacher” participants also knew that the “learners” were not receiving dangerous, lifethreatening shocks, would the study still be about obeying authority figures in extreme
situations?
Not all psychology research depends so clearly on deception. Obedience to
authority research is just one of many topics typically studied with deception. Topics
such as social rejection are often studied with deceptive protocols, compounding the
dangers of using deception because participants in a negative mood are more suspicious
and more likely to detect deception (Forgas & East, 2008). Stereotyping research
examines both automatic unconscious and controlled conscious reactions to outgroup
individuals (Devine, 1989). By the very nature of stereotyping phenomena, some
behaviors are automatic and some are controlled. Participants that are aware that
stereotyping is being studied might report less stereotypes of Black individuals, whereas
naïve participants will be racially biased in the same protocol (Lepore & Brown,
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2002).Informed participants’ responses may be due to unbiased tendencies, social
pressure, or implicit influences that are not immediately accessible by the participants
themselves?
For theoretical and empirical reasons, the first assumption—that suspicion does
not change the results of an experiment—is itself suspect. The problems associated with
this assumption are nonexistent if participants have no suspicion about the study to begin
with. This second assumption, however, has its own problems.
Do participants arrive at the study with no information?
For most experimental research, it is tacitly assumed that participants arrive to a
study naïve to the true nature of the research. In reality, participants can get information
about a study from a variety of sources. Crosstalk, the tendency for individuals in the
participant pool to communicate with one another about the details of a study, increases
over the course of an academic semester (Edlund, Sagarin, Skowronski, Johnson, &
Kutter, 2009). Crosstalk can occur within a week of experimentation (Glinksi, Glinksi, &
Slatin, 1970). Almost half of participants contacted by a confederate posing as a future
participant in a meta-experiment by Lichtenstein (1973) shared details of the study they
were instructed to keep secret; when participants were contacted by phone, 15 out of 19
shared information.
Participants that have experienced deception respond differently to subsequent
experiments involving deception, perhaps to an increased vigilance or by the influence of
demand characteristics (Cook &Perrin, 1971). Exacerbating these effects, participants
who experience deception can exhibit noticeably different behaviors in the lab for up to
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three months (Epley & Huff, 1998). Participants may become suspicious due to withinexperiment factors as well.
Do experimental designs indicate to participants that they are being deceived?
Participants can resolve the details of a study during the procedure itself; Taylor
and Sheppard (1996) report an incident in which a graduate student was used as a standin for a participant who unexpectedly canceled their appointment in a group experiment.
Pretending to be another participant, the graduate student listened in as the participants
shared the details they had collectively received about the study, uncovering the full
research design in the process. The participants in this experiment had been explicitly
told they were not allowed to share the details of the study in this way, and only one of
the participants the graduate student overheard hinted at the conversation in a postexperimental inquiry (PEI). The majority of researchers use some form of PEI just for the
purpose of discovering the level of information participants know (Blackhart, Brown,
Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 2011). Similar to Taylor and Sheppard’s (1996) happenstance
finding, other researchers with knowledge of participant information level have found
PEI use to be inaccurate.
Do PEIs accurately detect suspicion or information?
Growing evidence suggests that post-experimental inquiries do not, in reality,
delineate very well between naïve and non-naïve participants. Some researchers (for
example, see Aronson, 1968) report highly accurate PEIs. The majority of studies,
however, report the opposite. When confederates were used to reveal a Naïve,
Suspicious, or Informed information level to participants, Golding and Lichtenstein
(1970) found no significant differences in participants’ self-reported awareness of the
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study design or admission of receiving prior information in their PEI. Taylor and
Sheppard (1996) received no strong reports of suspicion from participants that a graduate
student literally witnessed discussing the experiment’s details. Levy (1967) reported an
accuracy of one in 16 while Sagarin, Rhoads, and Cialdini (1998) reported one in 81.
Nichols and Maner (2008) as well as McMillan and Austin (1971) reported zero PEI
accuracy in different procedures.
Blackhart et al (2012) again used a confederate to directly supply participants
with a Naïve or Informed prompt. While the Informed participants reported significantly
more awareness of the study hypothesis and admission of receiving information than the
Naïve participants, the self-reported levels of awareness and receipt of information were
abysmally lower than the true, experimentally introduced levels of information. The trend
seen in the majority of studies is that PEI accuracy is generally low.
Is there any hope for PEI accuracy?
Despite so much evidence that PEIs are inaccurate, steps can be taken to improve
their accuracy. Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) introduced a scientific integrity prompt
to some participants that significantly increased PEI accuracy. Blackhart et al (2012)
experimentally manipulated whether participants received the PEI in-person or alone on a
computer. It was found that participants responding anonymously on a computer
produced significantly more accurate PEIs. Other measures, such as offering participants
an extra credit or cash reward, have mixed or harmful efficacy (Blackhart et al, 2012).
Blackhart and colleagues (2012) attempted to discover why participants report
such low rates of honesty. The most commonly cited reasons were concerns about not
receiving credit (or payment), concerns about getting someone in trouble (42% expressed
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concerned about getting themselves in trouble, while 35% expressed concern about
getting someone else in trouble), and concerns about appearing foolish. These selfreported areas of concern are personal concerns, whereas researchers using PEIs do so for
professional considerations.
What is the next step?
Progress has been made in discovering avenues to a more accurate PEI, but even
the most promising results (e.g. Blackhart, et al, 2011) did not produce high levels of
accuracy. In the present study, knowledge from the discipline of psychology itself was
used to attempt to improve PEI accuracy. A previously used meta-experimental technique
to assess PEI accuracy (adapted from Blackhart et al, 2012) was adapted for use with an
experimental procedure that is, theoretically, very dependent on proper participant
naïveté. As mentioned, one area in psychology that utilizes and depends on deceptive
procedures is the study of stereotyping and prejudice. Research in this area is easily
influenced by demand characteristics. For this reason, many protocols (for example,
Lepore & Brown, 2002) are burdensome or impossible to perform without deception. If
participants are aware of the purpose of a study measuring their prejudiced attitudes
toward racial minorities, they may monitor their responses and curb naturally occurring
responses. In fact, this appears to be exactly the case in a recent study exploring the effect
of racial primes on prejudicial attitudes. Participants who became suspicious of the
manipulation used by Lepore and Brown (2002), as determined by a suspicion probe,
differed from non-suspicious participants. A statistically significant interaction emerged
in which low-prejudice participants and high-prejudice participants reversed their scores
relative to non-suspicious individuals. Because of the methodological difficulties
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associated with this study, this procedure was a perfect candidate for the metaexperimental test of a PEI.
The aims of the current study were to improve upon previous PEI procedures.
PEIs are administered at the end of an experiment and are restricted in several ways by
the nature of psychological inquiry. PEIs cannot be too invasive or probing at the risk of
causing naïve participants to then become suspicious; on the other hand, PEIs must be
detailed enough to elicit information from participants (Stricker, 1969). PEI questions
vary from researcher to researcher and across experiments (Blackhart et al, 2012). In
searching for candidate techniques to improve PEI accuracy, then, a good practice would
be to implement procedures that are uncomplicated, theoretically promising, and can be
generalized to PEIs in various areas of research. The PEI was augmented in the current
study by the manipulation of two social influence techniques, a descriptive norm prime
and a default option switch. The reasoning for the selection of these techniques is
outlined below.
The social influence of descriptive norms
Psychology has a wide and deep foundation of research on social influence
techniques (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Social norms inform as to the proper or typical
behavior in a situation. Norms can be classified into descriptive and injunctive.
Descriptive norms are those that describe what the typical behavior in a certain situation
is; injunctive norms are those that describe the belief about what is typically approved
behavior, by some standard, in a certain situation (Cialdini & Goldsteain, 2004; Cialdini,
Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Social norms are most efficacious when they are most salient
(Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000).
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Participants have expectations about what “typical participants” do during
experiments, and what “typical participants” ought to do during experiment. These
expectations are usually not formalized. When directly asked, participants expect some
level of deception in psychology research and express hesitation at reporting harmful
information to researchers (Blackhart et al, 2012, Study 4). Participants could be given
information about the injunctive norm to give accurate feedback during experiments, but
reminding naïve, non-suspicious participants that they should report suspicions may have
the unintended consequence of eliciting suspicions. In the present research, participants
brought their own social norm evaluations to bear when completing the PEI. The
descriptive norms brought to the study by participants may have varied. If the prevailing
norm for a participant was to withhold information in psychology research, that
participant might have been less likely to give accurate information on the PEI.
Presenting participants with an opposite descriptive norm--that participants in similar
studies divulge information that may be damaging to the study--was expected to increase
reporting on the PEI by making the norm not only known but salient (Goldstein, Cialdini,
& Griskevicius, 2008).
The inertia of choosing the default option
In a choice situation the default option is often favored. This can be due to a lack
of effort or an assumption that the default option is preferred (Johnston & Goldstein,
2003). Another explanation may be that the default option carries an implied descriptive
norm. Changing the default option can have drastic consequences, as in the case of organ
donation. Keeping many important factors controlled for, European nations who require
citizens to opt-out of being an organ donor have double the organ-donation rates of
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nations with opting-in as the default choice (Johnston & Goldstein, 2003). The bias
toward lack of action in choice has also been found in a controlled laboratory setting
(Baron & Ritov, 1994).
In the typical PEI, participants are asked general questions about the study but are
not required to volunteer any information (see Blackhart, et al, 2012 for examples of
typical PEI questions). This may be biasing participants in two ways. First, the “default”
option is to give no information regarding prior information by leaving the form blank;
this may lead to the default position bias outlined above. Second, participants may
suspect that the norm is to withhold information, leading to a lack of admission typical of
that perceived norm.
Social desirability and social monitoring
While the primary goal of the current study was to test external influences on
participants’ responding on the PEI, individual differences also play a role in participant
responding. Social desirability and demand characteristics are often used as an
explanation of participants’ lack of responding to PEI questions (Blackhart et al, 2012;
Gallo, Smith, & Mumford, 1973; Golding & Lichtenstein, 1973). Measures such as the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale can be used to assess the level of social
desirability present in participants (Reynolds, 1982). Social monitoring, the degree to
which one monitors one’s actions by taking into account observation by another (Snyder,
1974), is another trait measure that can be used to test the oft-voiced worry about
participant demand characteristics. Participants high in social monitoring may be more
aware of the social consequences of their behavior in an experiment, and may answer
questionnaires in less stereotypical ways as a result, for example.
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Experimental Design and Hypotheses
A previously used deceptive procedure was replicated with the addition of a new
formal PEI to determine if participant awareness of the study protocol changed the
findings of the original research protocol. The study is also an evaluation of the PEI
itself, introducing controlled independent variables with the goal of improving PEI
accuracy. The PEI procedure used in the present study was representative of procedures
commonly used by social psychologists (Blackhart et al, 2012); evidence for its
improvement, then, should be applicable to many experimenters in this field.
Utilizing a procedure first used by Levy (1967) and replicated recently by
Blackhart et al (2012), participant awareness of the project hypothesis was directly
manipulated. Although it can be expected that baseline knowledge of any experiment
involving deception will increase in the participant pool while the study is active (Edlund,
et al, 2009), the levels of participant awareness are not endogenously large enough to use
as an intrinsic variable. Instead, awareness of the study hypothesis was directly
manipulated by the experimental procedure via an experimental confederate. This
changes the ordinary study design into a deception within a deception, in essence. Using
this procedure, participants completing the study were divided into Informed and Naïve
groups and compared. As in previous research (Blackhart, et al, 2012), different
independent variables were then introduced in an attempt to improve the PEI accuracy.
Thus, in this study-within-a-study design, participants arrived at the lab and
completed a typical stereotype activation procedure by filling out some questionnaires on
paper then completing some computer tasks. Before this began, however, an extra layer
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of experimental manipulation happened—a confederate encountered the participant and
started a conversation with him or her, providing them with information (or not, in the
control condition) about the manipulation of stereotype information in the study. We
hypothesized an interaction effect whereby participants who knew about the manipulation
of their stereotypes and experienced a cognitive task designed as an ethnic prime would
report abnormally low levels of negative attitude toward a fictional person believed to be
Black. Therefore, an interaction effect in which those who were informed and primed
with negative stereotypes would report the lowest levels of negative attitude, relative to
all other groups, was expected. It was also expected that participants’ negative rating of a
hypothetical individual would be inversely related to social monitoring and social
desirability.
Several simple independent variable effects were expected from ANOVA
analyses of participants’ Admission and Awareness scores across all groups. Participants
in the Informed condition were hypothesized to report higher Awareness and Admission.
Participants in the Opt-out condition were predicted to report more Awareness and
Admission. Participants in the descriptive norm prime condition were expected to report
more Awareness and Admission.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants and design
Participants were recruited via the University of North Dakota’s SONA data
collection system. Participants signed up online to complete a study ostensibly about
“word comprehension.” Seven participants were excluded from analyses for failing to
complete the administered measures or choosing to leave before the study was
completed, which participants could choose to do at any point in the experiment; this left
a total sample size of 144. None of the participants that did choose to leave the study
early raised any suspicions or discomforts before doing so. The sample was primarily
female (N = 124), while a minority were male (N = 19) or declined to answer (N = 1).
Participants were recruited from introductory level psychology classes only. Accordingly,
the sample consisted primarily of freshman (N = 54) and sophomore (N = 64) students at
the University of North Dakota; a minority were junior (N = 19) or senior (N = 5)
students and one student declined to answer. Corresponding with class standing, the
sample was very young, M = 19.52 years, SD = 2.24; only 11 participants were above the
age of 21. The majority of participants were Caucasian, N = 131. Using G*Power 3.1, an
estimate of sample size needed to achieve a power of .80 was estimated using similar
effect size to Blackhart et al (2012). To achieve similar effect sizes, approximately 300
participants were necessary; the actual sample was approximately half.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 16 experimental conditions with a
2 (informed vs. naïve) x 2 (ethnic primes vs. neutral words) x 2 (Opt-in vs. Opt-out) x 2
(norm prime vs. control) factorial design.
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Informed/Naïve Condition
Upon arrival at the experimental setting, participants followed instructions posted
at the study location to have a seat. While the participant was waiting, the experimenter
greeted him/her and informed him/her that another participant was not done in the lab.
The experimenter provided the participant a packet of materials including a
demographics questionnaire, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and the
Personal Reactions Inventory. While the participant was filling out these forms, the
previous “participant” (in reality, our experimental confederate) exited the lab and
greeted the current participant. The confederate was instructed to strike up a conversation
with the participant and administer one of two prompts. The confederate either engaged
in small talk (“Naïve” condition) or told the participant critical information about the
upcoming study (“Informed” condition). In the Naïve condition, confederates used the
script “Hey, how’s it going. Are you doing that word comprehension study? Oh, I did that
study.” If the participant asked for more information, the confederate was trained to say,
“I don’t really remember, but I did some stuff on the computer.” In the Informed
condition, the script was “Hey, how’s it going. Are you doing that word comprehension
study? Oh, I did that study. They don’t really care about the words; they’re really looking
for racism.” If the participant asked for more information, the confederate was trained to
say, “I don’t really remember, but they told me the stuff on the computer was looking at
racism.” After waiting approximately five minutes, the experimenter returned to bring the
participant into the lab setting. This time period was allotted to ensure that experimenters
did not overhear the participant information level and to ensure that participants had time
to complete the forms.
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Social desirability and Social monitoring scale information.
The 13 item Marlowe-Crown Desirability inventory (Reynolds, 1982)
administered during this step was a measure of the tendency for participants to respond in
a socially desirable manner; in other words, how likely participants are to respond in the
manner they see as desirable above and beyond an unbiased answer. Participants
responded to questions such as “I have never deliberately said something that hurt
someone’s feelings”; participants who answer False to questions of this type are said to
display greater social desirability. The scale was internally reliable, Cronbach’s α = .663.
The Personal Reactions Inventory (Snyder, 1974) was a measure of social monitoring
that measures monitoring oneself to adhere to proper self-presentation. Participants
responded to true/false questions such as “I may deceive people by being friendly even
when I really dislike them”, with an answer of True displaying great social monitoring.
This 25 item scale was internally reliable, Cronbach’s α = .618.
Lexical decision task (Ethnic Prime/No prime Condition).
Upon entering the experimental room, participants completed the Lexical
Decision Task (LDT) using Inquisit by Millisecond Software. The LDT presents
participants with rapidly appearing and disappearing English words along with Englishappearing nonwords. Participants were tasked with deciding if the letters on the screen
are a word or nonword and pressing an appropriate key on the keyboard to indicate their
choice. The LDT has a control and experimental condition. In the experimental Ethnic
prime condition, some of the English words were neutral (Blacks) while others were
negative racial primes (i.e., nigger, unemployed) adapted from Lepore & Brown, 1997
Study 3. In the control condition, all English words were neutral with regard to race.
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Impression Formation Task
After participants completed the LDT, they completed the Impression Formation
Task used by Lepore & Brown (2002). The impression formation task was introduced to
participants as an unrelated measure. While signing up to participate in the study,
participants were informed the study has multiple unrelated components.
In the Impression Formation task, participants were presented with eight
sentences describing an individual; each sentence expressed a positive or negative
stereotype for a total of four each. Participants then rated the individual on 21 rating
scales that were used to assess positive or negative attitude toward the fictional person.
Participants that were exposed to the ethnic prime were more likely to implicitly assume
that the hypothetical individual was Black and adjust the positive and negative ratings
accordingly.
Post-experimental Inquiry
Participants then engaged in the PEI designed to assess whether they had any
prior knowledge of the study, were suspicious of the study, or knew/guessed the
hypothesis of the study. In one version of the PEI, the form automatically assumed
participants had previous knowledge of the study (Opt-out), and participants had the
option to check a box indicating to the contrary; another version will be the standard PEI
asking participants to volunteer any knowledge (Opt-in, Control). Some participants were
informed in the PEI instructions that of participants with prior knowledge, a majority
indicate so on the form (Norm prime); others did not receive this additional information
(Control). All forms of the PEI contained the same questions, only differing by one
checkbox independent variable and one prompt independent variable. The PEI consisted
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of free-response questions. The PEI was coded into two independent categories,
awareness of the study hypothesis (Awareness) and admission of receiving previous
information (Admission).
Following the presentation of these questions, participants were debriefed and
given an opportunity to ask questions. The impression formation sentences, PEI
questions, and Admission/Awareness coding criteria are found in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Social Desirability and Social Monitoring
It was expected that social desirability and social monitoring would be positively
related to a more positive rating of the hypothetical individual. In other words,
participants with high social monitoring were expected to adjust their response to the
hypothetical individual to be more positive. No significant correlations were found
between social desirability scores and rating of the individual. The most robust
correlation found was between the Personal Reactions Inventory and Negative rating for
only individuals in the Informed information condition, r = .22, p = .07. In other words,
for participants with information about the study design higher social monitoring was
related to higher negative rating of the fictional individual.
The Spearman rho correlation was used to detect relationship between Admission
and Awareness with social desirability. Interestingly, for all participants combined
Admission and Awareness were correlated, rho = .50, p < .001. For Naïve participants,
this relationship did not hold, rho = .053, p = .66. The relationship appears to originate
from Informed participants, rho = .60, p < .001.
Informed participants did show a positive relationship between social monitoring
and Negative Rating, rho = .26, p = .03, such that participants high in social monitoring
rated the hypothetical individual as having more negative qualities, the opposite direction
than predicted.
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Negative attitude toward a hypothetical individual
An interaction effect was expected such that Informed/Ethnic prime participants
would rate the individual with less negative ratings, compared to all other groups. A 2
(Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Ethnic prime/Control) ANOVA was performed to determine
changes in negative attitudes. The main effect of confederate information
(Informed/Naïve) was not significant, F(1, 144) = 2.381, p = .125, η2 = .016. The main
effect of Ethnic prime (Ethnic prime/Control) was also not significant, F(1, 144) = .56, p
= .45, η2 = .004. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 144) = .615, p = .43, η2 = .004.
For group means, see Table 1. The observed power for the main effect of confederate
information indicated a low chance of detecting an effect, .335, and the observed power
for Ethnic prime and the interaction were minimal, <.13. This suggests that although no
effect was found, the lack of statistical significance could be an issue of inadequate
power. The ANOVA analysis was conducted with less participants than minimum
recommendations; ratings were almost identical across conditions, indicating lack of
effect, lack of power, or inadequate sampling.
Social influences on Admission and Awareness
It was hypothesized that both social influence independent variables would increase both
Admission and Awareness. Admission and Awareness were scored on a 1 – 5 scale, with
1 indicating no information given and 5 indicating full Awareness of the study hypothesis
or full Admission of receiving detailed information about the study (for full scoring
information, see Appendix). Over half of participants received a score of 1 on Awareness
and a score of 1 on Admission (see Table 2 for full breakdown). Only 29 out of 145
participants received a score of 5 on Awareness. Broken down by information level
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(Informed x Naïve), one of these participants were in the Naïve group. Only 19
participants scored a full 5 on Admission; all 19 were Informed.
Participant information level. Participants in the Naïve information level
experienced a laboratory experiment that was typical of many studies in social, cognitive,
and other areas of psychology. Thus, a χ2 test was performed for both Awareness and
Admission using the frequencies of Awareness and Admission in the Naïve level as
expected frequencies and the frequencies of Awareness and Admission in the Informed
level as observed frequencies. In this way, the direct result of providing participants with
outside information about the study can be assessed. For the purposes of the χ2 test, the
five levels of Awareness and Admission were collapsed to two. Participants receiving a
score of 1 to 3 on Admission or Awareness were coded as providing minimal
information, while participants scoring a 4 to 5 were coded as providing substantial
information. The cutoff point was a practical one: participants providing the type of
information that would merit a 4 or 5 would, in ordinary studies, be candidates to be
excluded from data analysis (such as in Lepore & Brown, 1997).
The χ2 test for Awareness was significant, χ2 = 502.86, p < .001, indicating that
more participants in the Informed condition provided more substantial information than
in the Naïve condition. The χ2 test for Admission was significant, χ2 = 526.16, p < .001,
indicating that participants in the Informed condition provided more substantial
information than in the Naïve condition.
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Table 1. Mean Negative Attitude scores by group
Confederate. info*

Mean

Ethnic Prime**

Mean

Informed

5.74

Ethnic Prime

5.81

Naïve

6.02

Control

5.95

*All participants divided by level of information provided by the confederate.
**All participants divided by seeing neutral words or stereotype activation words in the
Lexical Decision task.
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Table 2. Awareness and Admission scores for all participants and subdivided by
information level.
Summary of Awareness and Admission
Awareness and Admission for all participants
Admission

Frequency

Awareness

score

Frequency

score

1

100

1

89

2

7

2

15

3

12

3

4

4

7

4

8

5

19

5

29

Awareness and Admission subdivided by Information level
Admission

Informed freq

score

Naïve

Awareness

freq

score

Informed freq

Naïve freq

1

44

56

1

34

55

2

2

5

2

5

10

3

5

7

3

2

2

4

6

1

4

7

1

5

19

0

5

28

1
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Awareness. A 2 (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive
norm/Control) x 2 (Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA was conducted for Awareness. The
main effect of confederate information was significant, F(1, 129) = 36.33, p < .001, η2 =
.22, with participants in the Informed condition (M = 2.84) scoring higher than
participants in the Naïve condition (M = 1.33). The ANOVA analysis was performed for
Awareness and for Admission with lower than the minimum recommended number of
participants.
The main effects of Ethnic prime and Default option swap were not significant;
all interactions were nonsignificant (see Table 3). The observed power the effect of Norm
prime was small, .261, and observed power for the remaining effects were smaller, <.18.
While the effects were nonsignificant, it should be observed that the trend for the
Norm prime and Ethnic prime conditions matched expectations, with participants in the
Norm prime condition (M = 2.25) scoring higher than participants in the Control
condition (M = 1.92). Participants in the Ethnic prime condition scored higher (M = 2.11)
than those in the Control condition (M = 2.07). For the Default option swap independent
variable, the Control group actually scored higher (M = 2.22) than the Opt-out group (M
= 1.96), the opposite trend predicted.
Admission. A 2 (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive
norm/Control) x 2 (Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA was also conducted for Admission.
The main effect of confederate information was significant, F(1, 129) = 19.28 , p < .001,
η2 = .130, with participants in the Informed condition admitting to more information (M
= 2.36) than participants in the Naïve condition (M = 1.34). No further main effects or
interactions were significant (see Table 4). The mean values for the Ethnic prime (M =
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1.83, S.E. = .16) and control condition (M = 1.87, S.E. = .16) were practically identical.
The trend for the Norm prime condition was in the hypothesized direction, but the
Default option swap experimental condition appeared to have no effect.
Nonparametric tests
The dependent variables Awareness and Admission were measured on an ordinal
scale and had non-normal distributions. Thus, non-parametric analyses were used to
examine the hypotheses concerning these variables.
Nonparametric tests for Awareness. Because the data collected for Awareness
was non-normal and ordinal, non-parametric testing was appropriate. The a priori
hypothesis concerning the effect of the Ethnic prime condition on awareness was tested
using a Mann-Whitney U test. The Mann-Whitney U test was not significant, U =
2619.00, p = .97; the nonparametric test was also not significant if participants were
divided by information level (Informed or Naïve).
Nonparametric tests for Admission. Admission scores were also non-normal
and ordinal, thus nonparametric tests were performed. Our a priori hypotheses were that
the Norm prime condition and the Opt-out condition would increase Admission rates over
control. The Mann-Whitney U test for Admission changes over levels of Norm prime was
not significant, U = 2356.50, p = .22; the test was also not significant for single levels of
participant information (Informed or Naïve). The Mann-Whitney U test for changes in
Admission across levels of Opt-out was also not significant, U = 2277.00, p = .09. When
the sample was divided by participant information level, Naïve participants were
significantly different in the Opt-out condition, U = 479.50, p = .047, such that control
participants (Mean rank = 38.52) had a higher level of Admission than Opt-out
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Table 3. Two (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive norm/Control) x 2
(Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA on Awareness. IN = Informed/Naïve. EP = Ethnic
Prime/Control. NP = Norm prime/Control. OPT = Option swap/Control
IV
Df
F
Sig
η2
Power
IN

1

36.329

.000

.220

1.000

EP

1

.030

.862

.000

.053

NP

1

1.765

.186

.013

.261

OPT

1

1.062

.305

.008

.176

IN * EP

1

.311

.578

.002

.086

IN * NP

1

.091

.763

.001

.060

IN * OPT

1

.040

.841

.000

.055

EP * NP

1

.025

.874

.000

.053

EP * OPT

1

.076

.784

.001

.059

NP * OPT

1

.091

.763

.001

.060

IN * EP * NP

1

.278

.599

.002

.082

IN * EP * OPT

1

.243

.623

.002

.078

IN * NP * OPT

1

1.369

.244

.010

.213

1

.408

.524

.003

.097

1

.243

.623

.002

.078

EP * NP *
OPT
IN * EP * NP *
OPT
Within

129
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Table 4. Two (Informed/Naïve) x 2 (Opt-in/Opt-out) x 2 (Descriptive norm/Control) x 2
(Ethnic prime/No prime) ANOVA on Admission. IN = Informed/Naïve. EP = Ethnic
Prime/Control. NP = Norm prime/Control. OPT = Option swap/Control
IV
Df
F
Sig
η2
Power
IN

1

19.280

<.001

.130

.992

EP

1

.028

.868

.000

.053

NP

1

1.629

.204

.012

.245

OPT

1

2.482

.118

.019

.346

IN * EP

1

.250

.618

.002

.079

IN * NP

1

2.428

.122

.018

.340

IN * OPT

1

.003

.954

.000

.050

EP * NP

1

.041

.839

.000

.055

EP * OPT

1

.551

.459

.004

.114

NP * OPT

1

1.227

.270

.009

.196

IN * EP * NP

1

.012

.913

.000

.051

IN * EP * OPT

1

.167

.683

.001

.069

IN * NP * OPT

1

1.931

.167

.015

.281

1

.765

.383

.006

.140

1

1.041

.310

.008

.173

EP * NP *
OPT
IN * EP * NP *
OPT
Within

129
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participants (Mean rank = 31.96). This was the opposite direction than predicted.
Informed participants were not significantly different across that condition, U = 659.50, p
= .48.
Chi square tests on social influence and ethnic prime. Due to the
nonparametric nature of the Awareness and Admission variables, an additional set of
non-parametric χ2 tests were performed to assess the deviation of the experimental
condition results from control conditions. The χ2 tests were perhaps more appropriate for
this dataset; the Awareness and Admission scores fell primarily into either category 1 or
category 5, fitting a binary pattern better than a distribution. For both Awareness and
Admission, data from control conditions were used as the expected frequencies; data
from participants receiving the experimental manipulation served as the observed
frequencies. Again, data from Awareness and Admission were entered on the binary scale
of Minimal information or Substantial information. These analyses showed only one
statistically significant difference (see Table 5): participants that did not receive the
Ethnic prime and did receive the Norm prime reported greater levels of Admission, χ2 =
5.12, p = .024.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
For an experimental procedure specifically aimed at eliciting accurate feedback,
the Awareness and Admission scores of participants was distressingly low. Almost all of
the participants in the study with compromising information about the study design did
not hint at this information. Across experimental conditions, Informed participants did
report more Awareness and Admission. The Informed participants were explicitly told
information just before the experiment started that, on the PEI, should elicit scores of 5
for Awareness and Admission; thus, this result is unsurprising. While the increase was
statistically significant, the difference would have been much higher had participants
reported accurately on the PEI. Contrary to expectations, neither the norm prime nor the
opt-out condition improved Awareness or Admission.
Replicating the impression formation results
To the benefit of the impression formation procedure, perhaps, was our finding
that negative rating of a hypothetical individual was not related to information level; this
was contrary to our hypothesis that informed participants would show decreased negative
rating. Participants’ negative ratings were also unrelated to social monitoring or social
desirability. Lepore and Brown (1996) was not replicated-- participants in the ethnic
prime category did not expressed more negative attitude toward the individual. This
could be due to issues of power, or to the difference between the current sample
(University students in the U.S. Midwest) and the original study’s sample (U.K.
students). It is assumed that the attribution of negative traits to the hypothetical individual
(Lepore & Brown, 1996) represents implicit prejudices when the negative rating
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Table 5. Chi-squared comparisons of Informed participants receiving no experimental
manipulations to participants receiving listed experimental conditions. IN =
Informed/Naïve. EP = Ethnic Prime. NP = Norm prime. OPT = Option swap. Ct =
Control.
Awareness
Condition

Expected

Expected

Minimal

Substantial

Observed

Chi-

Sig

square

EP

NP

10

8

10, 11

.536

.464

EP

OPT

10

11

10, 8

.455

.500

EP

Combined

5

5

20, 19

.026

.873

Ct

NP

11

6

10, 10

1.894

.169

Ct

OPT

10

9

11, 7

.519

.471

Ct

Combined

5

4

5, 5

.125

.724

Combined

NP

21

14

20, 21

2.150

.143

Combined

OPT

20

20

21, 15

1.000

.317

Combined

Combined

10

9

10, 10

.056

.814

Expected

Expected

Observed

Chi-

Sig

Minimal

Substantial

Admission
Condition

square

EP

NP

13

5

14, 7

.323

.570

EP

OPT

15

6

12, 6

.200

.655

EP

Combined

7

3

27, 12

.011

.917

Ct

NP

13

43

11, 9

5.124

.024*

Ct

OPT

11

8

13, 5

1.516

.218

Ct

Combined

5

4

5, 5

.125

.724
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Table 5 cont.
Condition

Expected

Expected

Minimal

Substantial

Observed

Chi-

Sig

square

Combined

NP

26

9

25, 16

3.802

.051

Combined

OPT

26

14

25, 11

.313

.576

Combined

Combined

12

7

11, 9

.572

.449

*Significant, p < .05
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increases as a result of an ethnic prime. That these results were not replicated may
indicate that participants in our sample did not associate the ethnic prime with the
hypothetical individual, or may indicate that the participants in this sample do not have
elevated implicit biases against an individual they implicitly assume is Black. Some
participants did correctly report on the PEI that the study was attempting to manipulate
them into believing the individual was Black, however, only two Naïve participants were
classified as providing Substantial information about the true study hypothesis, however.
While the frequency of participant reporting is assuredly lower than actual participant
knowledge, this does suggest that fewer participants in the Naïve category than Informed
did believe the study was about race, bolstering the second interpretation.
The effect of social influence
The norm prime condition did increase PEI accuracy, but due to the lack of power
and small sample size for the ANOVA, this result was not statistically significant or
practically useful; the χ2 test on participants receiving a Norm prime prompt with neutral
words indicated a difference for Admission. The observed power for the each null
hypothesis in this experiment was far below the benchmark of .80. Previous research
shows that reported Admission and Awareness of the study hypothesis by participants is
rare (Blackhart, et al, 2012; Edlund, et al, 2009; Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970; Levy,
1967; and Lichtenstein, 1973). The level of participant Awareness and Admission was
low, even in the Informed condition, which was significantly greater than the Naïve
condition. This extreme positive skew hampers ANOVA analysis. The small cell sizes in
this experiment also cast doubt on the χ2 analyses. While issues of statistical power may
have prevented this effect from being statistically significant, the norm prime prompt
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used in this study did not elicit enough accurate feedback to be confidently recommended
for inclusion in PEI procedures. The norm prime used in this study could be changed to
increase the salience of both descriptive and injunctive norms, perhaps. In the current
study (see Appendix B), participants in the norm prime condition were told that previous
participants freely admitted problems or weaknesses in the study design. Participants
were told by the norm prime prompt that classmates and friends may share critical study
information and that this is a flaw in the study design, but were not explicitly told to
report this information on the PEI. The PEI questions prompted the reporting of this
information, however. While the logical steps between each piece of feedback are
apparent from a researcher’s-eye view of the study, perhaps participants in the moment
do not all connect these pieces. The caution against stronger, more specific questions is
that leading questions may arouse suspicion in participants where none existed before. If
more direct, suspicious questions were found to increase Admission or Awareness rates,
this would create a trade-off for researchers between obtaining accurate feedback and
reducing suspicion in the participant pool.
For the opt-out condition, no evidence was found that groups differed based on
receiving this condition. The default option swap has been shown to be effective for
important outcomes such as organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) but has not
been less explored for small effects such as the subtle implicit influences in the current
study. The default option swap was utilized in this study because it is a social influence
technique that is extremely easy to implement in PEIs while having empirically supported
efficacy. Its lack of effect in the current experiment indicates it is not appropriate for the
subtle social situation introduced in the lab. Participants may have been unconvinced to
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follow the implied truth-telling norm or the introduction of this norm, via the check box,
was not salient.
Can recommendations for PEI accuracy be made?
The primary purpose of this study was to attempt to increase Admission and
Awareness rates on a standard PEI. If the trends in the data are extrapolated and it is
assumed that the effects of Norm prime will be significantly positive (a very optimistic
interpretation of the data), the effect size of the likeliest candidate to increase PEI
accuracy, Norm prime, will most likely be small. While inclusion of a Norm prime aspect
to any PEI is not likely to be harmful, it is also not likely to solve the dilemma of PEI
accuracy. If the level of participant awareness in an experiment cannot be accurately
measured, this calls into question any conclusions drawn from that experiment that rely
on participant naiveté to the hypotheses.
Further explorations of social influence techniques may yield better results. Social
influence research encompasses many topics that might be applicable to a PEI.
Participants could be primed for the motives of reciprocity or liking, for example, by
encountering information about the benefits of participation or friendly experimenters,
for example (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). As mentioned previously, a trade-off between
eliciting suspiciousness and increasing accuracy might be achievable by giving
participants specific, guided questions about previous research knowledge.
Other factors, not addressed in this research, may be contributing to PEI accuracy.
The participants recruited for this study were from introductory psychology classes such
as Introduction to Psychology and Introduction to Statistics. This step was taken to
minimize the amount of experience students had with research methods and experimental
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designs. Perhaps students with more knowledge of research methods would be more
likely to report accurately no PEIs. While this would not solve the problem of recruiting
suspicious freshmen for psychology studies, it might lead to a practical way to improve
PEI accuracy such as focusing on research methods during entry-level psychology
classes. The minority of students that were not freshman or sophomores were,
presumably, new to the major of psychology.
In conversations about PEI accuracy with colleagues, the discussion is usually
framed in terms of participant honesty. While participant dishonesty may be the primary
source of PEI inaccuracy, it may also be unawareness by participants about what
constitutes questionable information they receive about a study. In some of our PEI free
response answers, participants are clearly aware that a stray remark “about racism” is
potentially damaging to the data they have provided. In the majority of answers, however,
participants express nothing of the sort. The deception element in the study protocol is,
hypothetically, so convincing that Informed participants are in some sense still deceived.
Implicit tendencies, such as different response behavior on IATs, may apply to this subset
of participants without their awareness.
Conclusion
In a study specifically designed to assess truthful participant suspiciousness and
study information, the truthful reporting of study information was abysmally low. While
it is unfortunate that the results of this experiment were inconclusive, these null results
ironically highlight the need for greater care in PEI construction and greater caution in
interpreting results of studies involving deception.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Scoring rubric for Awareness and Admission scores
Awareness
1 – No awareness or suspicion of the experimental deception or purpose of the study
indicated.
2 – General suspiciousness about the purpose of the study or how the parts of the study
relate, but participant is completely unaware of the deception or true purpose of the study.
This includes general suspicion of psychology studies.
3 – Targeted incorrect suspicion. Suspicion about a particular part of the study (e.g., the
experimental confederate, the feedback given, specific tasks that were completed).
4 – Partial or inaccurate awareness of the experimental deception or true purpose of the
study. Mention of ethnicity or stereotypes without directly stating the study is assessing
racial stereotypes.
5 – Complete awareness. Any mention of racism or assessing racial stereotypes.
Admission
1 – No admission of prior information (i.e., denial of previous conversation).
2 – Admission of receiving public or ordinary info (i.e., SONA, info from the
experimenter or prompts).
3 – Admit to discussing the study with someone else, but no information shared; mention
of elements in the Naïve prompt.
4 – Admit to discussing the study and being told certain details; the details are vague or
inaccurate (but different than the Naïve prompt).
5 – Admission of receiving details of the study and expressing those details (i.e., “s/he
mentioned racism”).
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Appendix B
Post-experimental inquiry questions including experimental manipulations (marked in
italics).
PEI1 ("Instructions")
"We would like your feedback about the design of the study. We want to make sure that
our experimental design is sound, and we need your feedback to help us improve this
study. In addition, we want to know whether anything odd or irregular happened as you
participated in the study today. These things sometimes happen, and as long as we know
about them, we can correct for them, and make sure that our findings are valid and
reliable. It is therefore extremely important for the scientific validity of the study that you
tell us if anything like this happened today.
Please be as honest as possible in your answers; no feedback we receive, including
negative feedback, will result in a loss of research credit, nor will it affect how we use
your data. In fact, negative feedback is an important way for us to improve upon our
design for future studies. Be as detailed as you feel is necessary to fully answer each
question.
You may spend as much time on these questions as you want, but we ask that you spend
a minimum of 5 min answering these questions.
PEI2
Many things can go wrong in an experiment's design. Survey items can be confusing or
difficult. Technical difficulties often come up without the experimenter finding out. Before
an experiment, participants sometimes hear critical details of the study from classmates
or friends. Experimenters sometimes, accidentally, give out confusing or extra
information about a study. Participants sometimes, on their own, 'figure out' the study
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design. Research in this lab shows that, overwhelmingly, participants who identify
weaknesses in our studies reveal this."
PEI13 (appeared after “Instructions” or PEI2)
"Either on my own or by receiving it from classmates, friends, or acquaintances, I know
important details of the study that the experimenter is not aware of."
Checkbox option: "No, I am not withholding my knowledge of study information.")
PEI2
"In your own words, what was the present study about?"
PEI3
"Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than what the
experimenter had described to you?"
PEI4
"Did this affect your behavior in any way?"
PEI5
"Did you feel that certain reactions were expected from you at any time?"
PEI6
"Sometimes people may hear something about a study before they participate in that
study. Did you have any information about this study before participating, from any
source (e.g., from other students, your psychology instructor, psychology textbooks,
previous research you have participated in)? If yes, please tell us what information you
had before participating in the study (we are not interested in finding out how or from
whom that information was obtained)."
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PEI7
"Did you believe the experiment attempted to manipulate your attitude or behavior at any
point?"
PEI8
"Did you have any doubts or suspicions about any information given to you prior to your
participation or during the study?"
PEI9
"Did your experimenter do anything to cause you to be suspicious?"
PEI10
"Sometimes psychology studies include elements of deception. Did you expect to be
deceived in this study?"
PEI11
"Where there any questions or procedures in this study that were unclear, or any parts of
the study that were poorly designed (i.e., confusing, or with technical problems)?"
PEI12
"At any time, did the experimenter (accidentally or intentionally) act unprofessionally?
At any time, were you provided with additional, extra instructions (i.e., help you did not
ask for or want)?"

39

Appendix C
Impression formation task sentences.
He plays football regularly.
He sometimes forgets plans and dates that were made in advance.
He goes to parties most weekends.
He can easily get angry at people who disagree with him.
He cannot be bothered to be on time for meetings and appointments.
He goes jogging a few times a week.
He is fun to be around.
He sometimes shows road rage when on the highway.
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